The American present is at odds with representations of the American past. The American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers as contemporary commentators such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Giorgio Agamben contemplate the contours of American hegemony and superpower in a new era of empire. The global impact of present American politics, political economy, and foreign policy 1 is obvious to any casual observer of current affairs. The story of the American past, on the other hand, continues to be told in narratives that seem to be heading off somewhere else. In place of the growth of power, the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of relative powerlessness -a usually benign tale of legal-political self-abnegation, emphasizing constitutional restraints like federalism, checks and balances, the separation of powers, limited government, the rule of law, and laissez-faire. When presented more positively, American history is usually framed as a quest for freedom -the struggle for political liberty, emancipation from bondage, the rise of civil, economic, and social rights. Property, contract, and freedom of speech, press, and association form the constitutional backbone of a free market, a vigorous civil society, and a democratic polity -hallmarks of a free people. Oddly, key elements of this tale are kept alive in both older political histories of the liberal tradition in America as well as newer histories highlighting the rights and agency of particular cultural communities. Coming to terms with the historical rise of the
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is obvious to any casual observer of current affairs. The story of the American past, on the other hand, continues to be told in narratives that seem to be heading off somewhere else. In place of the growth of power, the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of relative powerlessness -a usually benign tale of legal-political self-abnegation, emphasizing constitutional restraints like federalism, checks and balances, the separation of powers, limited government, the rule of law, and laissez-faire. When presented more positively, American history is usually framed as a quest for freedom -the struggle for political liberty, emancipation from bondage, the rise of civil, economic, and social rights. Property, contract, and freedom of speech, press, and association form the constitutional backbone of a free market, a vigorous civil society, and a democratic polity -hallmarks of a free people. Oddly, key elements of this tale are kept alive in both older political histories of the liberal tradition in America as well as newer histories highlighting the rights and agency of particular cultural communities. Coming to terms with the historical rise of the mechanisms of legal, political, economic, corporate, and technological power that currently shape so much of the globe is thus a more difficult task than it should be. A true philosophical and political history of the American present continues to elude historians. 2 This disjunction between historical perception and political reality is not an entirely new phenomenon in the United States. As early as 1887 in a penetrating essay on "The American State and the American Man," Albert Shaw chided Americans for their laissez-faire fantasy: "The average American has an unequaled capacity for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred delusions. for President, Hollings' stump speech deployed several different versions of a story about "a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of the GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made sure his parents' farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and irrigated with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get subsidized school lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a National Science Foundation grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and one day, took AMTRAK to Washington to complain to his congressman about getting big government off people's backs." Like many Americans, "the guy" never saw the role of collective power in the creation of his individual declaration of independence. 3 Shaw and Hollings reveal a disconnect at the heart of the American experience -a tension between the story Americans like to narrate themselves about individualism, self-reliance, voluntarism, associationalism, free labor, and the free market and the actual history of the "concrete national institutions," as Shaw put it, that have been capable of wielding such broad interventionist, coercive, and regulatory power at home as well as abroad. Samuel Huntington once dubbed this yawning gap between facts and norms "cognitive dissonance" -an almost pathological tendency to confuse a fictional American ideal with historical political reality. From Thomas Jefferson's elision of slavery in the Declaration of Independence to Ronald Reagan's anachronistic invocation of John Winthrop's shining "city upon a hill," examples are obvious and legion and not always merely rhetorical. At the turn of the last century, Roscoe Pound surveyed the damage done when the United States Supreme Court took a "long step into the past" and imposed the fallacy of "liberty of contract" on modern industrial labor relations, as if the parties were still individual "farmers haggling over the sale of a horse." As Pound's example suggests, the problem is not so much one of psychology as of political economy. Shaw and Hollings foreground a particular American version of the tension at the center of social and political thought -the relationship between liberty and power, freedom and authority, contract and coercion, and law and violence. 4 A crucial component of this fraught American self-presentation concerns the nature, power, and reach of the American state. While much of modern history deals with the actions of powerful nation-states and the consequences of their rise, expansion, and sometimes fall, discussion of the American state (arguably one of the more influential in recent times) remains trapped in a different past and a peculiar idiom. The phrase "the American state" is seen as something of an oxymoron in a land of alleged "anti-statism" and "statelessness." When acknowledged at all, the American version of a state is viewed as something not quite fully formed -something less, something laggard, something underdeveloped compared to the mature governmental regimes that dominate modern European history. An enduring and exceptional tendency to view the American state throughout its history as distinctively "weak" continues to frustrate a reckoning with American power in the 21st century. The making and unmaking of this historical anachronism -the myth of the "weak" American state -is the subject of this essay.
The tired myth of the "weak" American state is to the history of American politics what the
Lochner court is to American constitutional law and what laissez-faire is to American political economy. Like the myths of Lochner and laissez-faire, the idea of a weak American state is the product of a larger tendency to read American history as exceptional -as the history of the making of a "new world" specially outside the historical currents and corruptions of "old" Europe. It is part of the myth of America as a place of rebirth -of American Adam emerging fresh from a veritable state of nature. As John Locke mused with almost biblical cadence, "Thus in the beginning all the World was America." The myth overemphasizes the so-called "natural" development of 5 individualism, private rights, civil society, free labor, and a free economy in American history. And consequently, it downplays the more historical and "artificial" role of collective decisionmaking, public law, government, and regulation in American political-economic development. In this mythical narrative, the state itself is seen as something of a menacing European contrivance that never really finds a place in a free, unregulated, and stateless America.
The idea of a weak American state originated in some classic sources and analyses. Alexis de Tocqueville's comparative emphasis on individualism, associationalism, localism, and administrative decentralization led him to underestimate the power of the state in America. Though many of Tocqueville's prophecies concerning democratic and despotic trends have relevance today, his forecast concerning American state development was largely inaccurate. "Unless I am strangely mistaken," he hedged in 1835, "The federal government of the United States is tending to get daily weaker; stage by stage it withdraws from public affairs, continually narrowing its sphere of action.
Being naturally weak, it gives up even the appearance of strength." G.W.F. Hegel continued the comparative European tradition of seeing in the American state something not wholly realized.
Reflecting on what he perceived to be an "entire immunity from public burdens," Hegel questioned whether the United States was a "real State" at all: "The general object of the existence of this State
is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity for a firm combination does not yet exist; for a real State and a real Government arise only after a distinction of classes has arisen." But even after the socio-economic transformations of the late 19 century -when class distinctions and public burdens th were clearly accelerating -a wide variety of commentators continued to find the answer to Werner Sombart's classic question "Why is there no Socialism in the United States?" in an exceptional
American political culture displaying a characteristic antistatism. 6 But ironically, the heyday for the popular expansion of the notion of the weak American state was the mid-20th century -in the heart of Henry Luce's "American Century." In the midst of brutal conflicts with totalitarian states, American scholars hesitated to draw direct comparisons between American politics and European statist regimes. On the contrary, a proliferation of "American studies" placed renewed emphasis on an exceptional national historical trajectory -an alternative American Sonderweg -rooted in negative liberty, voluntarism, self-interested liberalism, and a selfregulating market all limiting the role of the state in America's social and economic progress. In intense political times, historians like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Daniel J. Boorstin, and, to a lesser extent, Louis Hartz fashioned a compelling and remarkably consistent national narrative that explained America's special path as the product of a persistent preference for society over polity, individual initiative over collective action, and private competition and voluntarism over public regulation and state direction. Within this ideologically-charged interpretive template, the history of the American state (and its public policies and purposes) almost disappeared. Even radical governmental and regulatory interventions dissolved in the unbearably light miasma of national cultural mythology. Schlesinger's defanging of progressive reform was typical: "After the American fashion it was a doctrineless conviction, the product of an adjustment to new times for the sake of preserving the traditional spirit of self-reliance and free competition." 7 But perhaps the most remarkable testament to the resilience of the myth of the weak American state is the degree to which this Cold War fiction has only been reinvigorated by post-Cold War fascination with neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization. Despite an impressive social scientific effort in the 1980s and 90s "to bring the state back in" to the study of American history, led by pioneering historical sociologists like Theda Skocpol and political scientists like Stephen Skowronek, the myth of the weak American state persists. For reasons more fully elaborated below, the overarching tendency to characterize the American state as something of a false pretender to Hegel's notion of a "real State" continues unabated despite the proliferation of state-centered analyses of American political development. As Stephen Skowronek characteristically concluded, "One anomaly begets another. American exceptionalism has not been transcended by twentieth-century statebuilding, it has only taken on a new form." That new form has generated a series of odd adjectives that dot the bibliographic landscape as scholars strain to measure and gauge American state power with instruments and models seemingly devised for another time and place. The modern American state is still routinely described as "exceptional," "laggard," "incomplete," "backward," "uneasy," "maternalist," "reluctant," and "divided," reflecting the hold of historical typologies and teleologies first devised by European social theorists in the second half of the nineteenth century. The tendency 8 to talk about the American state using the explicit terminology of "weak" vs. "strong" has never been more prevalent. And for most commentators, the feeble side of that polarity (in an improbable tortoise-and-hare kind of twist) still appears to be winning. The American state remains in some of the most influential historical and theoretical accounts "a patchwork," "a hapless giant," "a weakened spring," "an incomplete conquest," and "a Tudor polity," -in a word, an anachronism. But this revision has really taken on a life and agenda of its own among a somewhat more junior group of scholars -historians and political scientists who have come of age in an era when European state regimes have appeared comparatively less threatening and more contained, while the American form of legal and economic order is being aggressively extended across the globe. The obvious present reality of American state power in the early 21 century is forcing a much-needed reconsideration of st the history of the rise of a global leviathan.
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The most significant and lasting tenet of this revisionism is that the American state is and always has been more powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and redistributive than 14 Especially in our present neoliberal moment, we should not be lulled into thinking that the American state is somehow retreating (after the New Deal and World War II, after the Great Society and Vietnam) to a more familiar pattern of privatization, deregulation, and laissez-faire. Despite the rising rhetoric, the power of the United States government to regulate, study, order, discipline, and punish its citizens -as well as other nation's citizens -has never been greater. As we confront contemporary neoliberalism, we should be attuned to what Sheldon Wolin calls the "paradox of power" in late modernity -that "power is simultaneously concentrated and disaggregated." Progressive Era reform. And it bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissezfaire, voluntarism, or antistatism. Instead, it is the story of the creation of extraordinarily powerful modern mechanisms of American governance. Liberalism and the rule of law were crucial parts of this new state regime. But as Frankfurt School social theorist Franz Neumann warned, one should not "fall victim to a historical fallacy" of associating liberal and legal elements with weakness: "The liberal state has always been as strong as the political and social situation and the interests of society demanded. It has conducted warfare and crushed strikes; with the help of strong navies it has protected its investment, with the help of strong armies it has defended and extended its boundaries, with the help of the police it has restored 'peace and order.' It . . . has rested upon force and law, upon sovereignty and freedom." This complex character of the American liberal state -embracing both force and law, sovereignty and freedom, contract and compulsion -demands new methods of historical evaluation. 16 In a provocative review of a recent survey of historical sociology and political development, the sociologist Andrew Abbott drew attention to the overwhelming bibliographical dominance of "the mainline European tradition" of classic social theory (Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and their progeny) in thinking about the social and political conditions of modernity and the almost total neglect of American social theory (James, Peirce, Ward, Dewey, Cooley, Mead, and Thomas). Abbott's observation is even more apposite when considering models of modern state development. For the major problem plaguing historical investigations of the American state is the tendency to force American experience into a theoretical frame designed around the emergence of modern European nation-states more than a century ago. In particular, the ideal types of Max Weber thoroughly dominate these assessments. Governmental organization and policymaking are routinely measured against Weber's chief characteristics of modern statecraft: 1) a rationalized and generalized legal and administrative order amenable to legislative change; 2) a bureaucratic apparatus of officers conducting official business with reference to an impersonal order of administrative regulations; 3) the power to bind -to rule and regulate -all persons (national citizens) and all actions within its official jurisdiction via its laws; and 4) the legitimate authority to use force, violence, and coercion within the prescribed territory as prescribed by the duly constituted government. Unification, centralization, rationalization, organization, administration, and bureaucratization have become the theoretical hallmarks of fullydeveloped, essentially modern states. Any departures or anomalies from this European model come to be seen as signs of underdevelopment -of backwardness or lag -usually chalked up to the peculiarities of the English or the Americans. In the social-theoretic teleology emanating from continental Europe, the American state is almost predetermined to fall short -predestined for perpetual weak state status. Pragmatism endorsed an anti-formalist, realistic, pluralistic, and instrumental approach to knowledge and investigation. It measured truth-claims by studying outcomes -the actual effects and consequences of ideas and institutions in practice. As James so provocatively put it, truth was something that "happens to an idea" -its "cash-value" -its ability to carry us usefully from one place to another and to make common sense out of human and historical experience. In place of endless metaphysical debates about definitions, essences, norms, formulas, models, and first principles, pragmatism promoted the actual social investigation of an idea's real-world consequences for living human beings. 21 The influence of the pragmatic method resounded well beyond philosophy. In law, economics, sociology, political science, and history, pragmatic approaches defined American social theory and social science in the early 20 century. In law, governance, and statecraft, pragmatism yielded an th impatience with technical discussions of the formal attributes of "the state" or the essence of the "rule of law" or the definition of "sovereignty," and a quest for a more sociological investigation of state policies and practices in action. John R. Commons, for example, dismissed the intellectual surplusage spent debating the nature of the state or sovereignty in favor of a more realistic examination of the everyday activities of governance. Commons approached the state simply as a "going concern," best grasped by looking at what it actually did in the real world. For Commons, "the state in reality" was no more than its "officials in action." In law, legal realist Karl Llewellyn charted a similar detour around the "myth, folderol, and claptrap" of normative debate about law's nature and toward the direct examination of law-in-action rather than law-in-theory. He echoed Commons's realistic, matter-offact, action-oriented approach: "The doing of something about disputes is the business of law. And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials do about disputes is to my mind, the law itself.
And rules through all of this are important so far as they help you see or predict what officials will do.
That is all their importance, except as pretty playthings." 22 The American pragmatic and realist approach to the state, in other words, eschewed the kind of abstract, formal definitions and typologies and that dominate state theory -the "pretty playthings" that routinely underestimate American state power. It recommended instead that one look in detail at what state officials of all kinds (not just state elites, but mayors, councilors, clerks, regulators, taxcollectors, administrative court judges, police, jailers, grand juries, etc.) actually did. The pragmatic perspective aimed at action-oriented "how" questions -how officials acted, how policy was made, how government functioned -as opposed to more essentialist questions about the nature or essence of law or the state. Pragmatists viewed the state through the "technologies of public action" that affected the day-to-day conduct and practices of real people in the real world. This active, sociological conception of public power -power is as power does -stands a much better chance of taking the full measure of the American state. 23 The Distribution of Power. A primary reason that American state power remains so hidden is that it is so widely distributed among an exceedingly complex welter of institutions, jurisdictions, On the contrary, in many cases they are the foundation of infrastructural governmental strength. The American system of government with its peculiar array of distributive technologies of state actiondivided sovereignty, separation of powers, federalism, delegation, incorporation, and the rule of law -allows for an extraordinary penetration of the state through civil society to the periphery. It also allows for a popular and legal legitimation of rule that has evaded some of the most centralized despotisms.
The Rule of Law. Thus far, this essay has argued that coming to terms with the American state requires a more pragmatic examination of the state in-action rather than in-theory, from the bottom-up rather than the top-down, taking account of the periphery as much as the center, horizontal organization as much as vertical consolidation, and the distribution, separation, and delegation of power as much as its centralization, rationalization, and integration. There is another element without which it is impossible to fully account for state power in the United States, and that is the rule of law.
One of the distinctive attributes of American governance is the central place of law in state formation and policy development. From the pivotal role of the Constitution in the creation of the nation to the pervasiveness of law, courts, judges, lawyers, and legal standards in everyday policymaking, the United States is distinctly a legal or jural state.
But as with the distribution and separation of powers, the legality of the American state has also been a constant source of confusion and misinterpretation. Emphasizing primarily the naysaying function of constitutional judicial review, the rule of law is too often portrayed simply as a limit or check on American state power -an obstacle to the development of modern administrative or regulatory authority. From the progressive histories of Charles Beard to the enduring mythology surrounding the Lochner Court, law has been continually represented as something of a conservative roadblock to liberal reform -part of a reactionary and exceptional American juridical tradition continually frustrating the development of a proper American welfare state. 26 But as sociological jurists, legal realists, and legal historians have been pointing out for some time now, American law has functioned as far more than a constitutional limitation on state development. Rather, law has long been an indispensable and creative source of expanding political and economic power, playing a uniquely positive rather than negative role in the creation of the modern American state. Willard Hurst has been the foremost exponent of such a realistic and positivist view of law's power, noting that in place of a "series of Thou Shalt Nots addressed to power holders," law should be understood as "the application of politically organized compulsion upon men's wills." Hurst's pioneering histories documented the constant involvement of law in state policymaking, from the instrumental transformation of contract, property, and tort giving legally protected scope to market action in the19 century to the no-less-radical expansion of the police power th and administrative and regulatory law in the 20 century. One can hardly begin to account for the th 27 rise of a modern state in the U.S. without examining crucial changes in police and criminal law, tort and contract law, labor and immigration law, corporation law, tax, finance, and securities law, regulation and administration, transportation and the law of public utilities, and laws involving health, education, and welfare. American state power is a product of legal processes of extraordinary depth, diversity, and durability. The output of those processes -whether as executive order, federal statute, judicial interpretation, statutory interpretation, administrative rule-making, state legislation, municipal ordinance, or even everyday police action -must be taken into account. Without a thorough examination of state action through law, courts, judges, and other legal officials, the power of the American state will remain elusive. powers widely through the private sector -enforcing its public capabilities, expanding its jurisdiction, and enhancing its legitimacy in the process. 29 While the history of private policing, government subsidies, and other delegations of public power to the private sphere is fairly well documented, the other side of the public-private distinction -the role of the American state in the very creation of the private sphere -is less routinely acknowledged. From the role of state charters in the establishment of associations and corporations to the role of law in the policing of property, the family, the market, and cultural life, the public powers of the jural state were crucial to the formation and sustenance of American civil society. As Karl
Polanyi observed about the market, "Economic history reveals that the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government." More recently, social and cultural historians have been making a similar case about the public construction of family, gender, and race relations.
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The most compelling analyses of American power have always refused to split the problem along a single either-or, public-private binary (e.g., the people vs. the interests; public good vs. private right; the state vs. the individual; regulation vs. the market). Instead, realistic and pragmatic approaches to American state development emphasize the interpenetration of public and private spheres -the convergence of public and private authority in everyday policymaking. Central to this perspective is the recognition that American power has long been distributed among a series of individuals, groups, parties, associations, organizations, and institutions not readily designated as wholly either public or private. Think for instance of the hybrid public-private roles of the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, Fannie Mae, the American Stock Exchange, the American Farm Bureau, the Federal Reserve, Underwriters Laboratories, the Ad Council, the American Legion, the American Red Cross, the YMCA, the East Bay Municipal Utility District, or the National Rifle Association. The ambiguous public-private power at the core of these institutions is emblematic of the larger distribution of public and private authority in the United States. By emphasizing the everyday intersection of the legal-political and the socio-economic, the realist perspective reveals the continuous public-private interplay of forces too often separated out in more polemical arguments: i.e., right and power, contract and coercion, autonomy and solidarity. Focusing on the convergence of public and private power in the actual output of the American state has two interpretive implications. First, it draws attention to the strong side of so-called weak state technologies, exposing the public delegation to private groups of the state's monopoly power over the legitimate use of force (to use Max Weber's terminology). Secondly, the realist perspective calls attention to the normative implications of such redistributions of power. As Cohen and Hale argued, the distribution of wealth in the United States cannot be viewed as the innocent byproduct of supposedly natural, essentially private market forces. Indeed, that market was itself the product of public law and historic political choices. Distributive claims are notoriously difficult to make from the perspective of "private" economics alone. But by exposing the "public" underwriting of property, contract, and enterprise in law and politics, the realist critique relates the distribution of wealth directly to the allocation of power in a democratic republic. When simultaneously talking about the public as well as the private -democracy as well as economy -distributional concerns must be taken more seriously. As Morris Cohen concluded, "It would be as absurd to argue that the distribution of property must never be modified by law as it would be to argue that the distribution of political power must never be changed." the official political acts of elites, electorates, interest groups, or social movements, these analysts instead embraced a more capacious conception of governance as "an activity which is apt to appear whenever men are associated together." More significantly, these political and legal realists never 35 forgot, amid the rhetoric of law and the pious platitudes that routinely flow from American political life, the very real, concrete consequences of the deployment of legal and political power. They never forgot the brutal fact that Robert Cover would later state so provocatively at the start of his article "Violence and the Word" that legal and political interpretation take place "in a field of pain and death." The real consequences of American state power are all around us. In a democratic republic, 36 where force should always be on the side of the governed, writing the history of that power has never been more urgent. Individualist City Councillor will walk along the municipal pavement, lit by municipal gas and cleansed by municipal brooms with municipal water, and seeing by the municipal clock in the municipal market, that he is too early to meet his children coming from the municipal school hard by the county lunatic asylum and municipal hospital, will use the national telegraph system to tell them not to walk through the municipal park but to come by the municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading room, by the municipal art gallery, museum and library, where he intends to consult some of the national publications in order to prepare his next speech in the municipal town-hall in favor of the nationalization of canals and the increase of the government control over the railway system. 'Socialism, sir,' he will say, 'don't waste the time of a practical man by your fantastic absurdities. Self help, sir, individual self-help, that's what's made our city what it is.'"
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